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1

In the

Supreme Comt of the State of Utah
GEORGE G. McANERNEY,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, DRIVERS' LICENSE D I V I SION, and GEORGE C. MILLER,
Director,

Case No.
8969

Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts as outlined in appellant's brief are substantially correct and are not in dispute.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
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INTRODUCTION
POINT II.
APPELLANT IS A HABITUAL NEGLIGENT
DRIVER.
(a)

DEFINITION.

(b)

THE PROOF ADDUCED BY THE STATE
WAS PROPER AND CONSTITUTIONAL.

(c)

THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO
PROVE HABITUAL NEGLIGENT DRIVING.
POINT III.

NO ERROR WAS COMMITTED BY PERMITTING TWO PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS TO BE
CONSIDERED IN ARRIVING AT THE CONCLUSION THAT THREE VIOLATIONS OCCURRED WITHIN AN EIGHTEEN MONTH
PERIOD.
POINT IV.
LICENSE TO DRIVE IS A PRIVILEGE AND
THE DISCRETIONARY ACTION OF THE DIRECTOR IS CONSTITUTIONAL.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
INTRODUCTION
The Legislature has plenary power over the highways,
which may impose conditions under which the limited right
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of use may be exercised, and may regulate the manner and
circumstances under which automobiles may be operated
thereon. Commonwealth v. Funk, 323 Pa. 390, 186 A. 65
(1936).
Pronouncements to the same effect may be found in
practically every state.
The power of the state to regulate traffic and prescribe
conditions under which motor vehicles may be operated
extends even to the power to prohibit their operation on
highways when conditions or circumstances render it reasonably necessary to bar such use for safety and protection
of the public.
This power (police power) is inherent in every sovereignty and permits the enactment of laws within constitutional limits to promote the general welfare of the citizens.
Therefore, in the interest of the public, the state may make
and enforce regulations reasonably calculated to promote
care on the part of all those who use its highways. Hadden
v. Aitken, et al., 156 Neb. 215, 55 N. W. 2d 620 (1952).
While it is the function of the State Legislature to make
and ordain the laws, such measures necessarily must be put
into effect by and through proper administrative agencies
of government, operating by virtue of power and authority
delegated to them by the Legislature. In the field of driver
licensing, these administrative functions have been conferred upon agencies such as the Department of Licensing
in the State of Utah and the Public Safety Department.
In all cases the Legislature selects the subject, and indicates the public policy with respect thereto. The subject
is thereby brought within governmental control.
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POINT 11.
APPELLANT IS A HABITUAL NEGLIGENT
DRIVER.
(a)

DEFINITION.

(b)

THE PROOF ADDUCED BY THE STATE
WAS PROPER AND CONSTITUTIONAL.

(c)

THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO
PROVE HABITUAL NEGLIGENT DRIVING.
POINT III.

NO ERROR WAS COMMITTED BY PERMITTING TWO PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS TO BE
CONSIDERED IN ARRIVING AT THE CONCLUSION THAT THREE VIOLATIONS OCCURRED WITHIN AN EIGHTEEN MONTH
PERIOD.
POINT IV.
LICENSE TO DRIVE IS A PRIVILEGE AND
THE DISCRETIONARY ACTION OF THE DIRECTOR IS CONSTITUTIONAL.
It seems completely logical to combine respondent's
arguments on Points II, III and IV of appellant's -brief.
We shall attempt to do so in order.

In answer to subparagraph (a) of Point II, respondent declares that the record discloses to any reasonable
mind that the appellant "repeated by force of habit" the violations charged against him. By his own admissions, Ex-
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hibit P-1 and R. 13-24, appellant concedes he knew of
posted limitations, but nevertheless contends if traffic was
light and conditions good, a minor excess in his driving
offended no one, hence he is not a habitual negligent driver.
We submit that under the definition of "habitual" as set
forth in appellant's brief, Mr. l\1cAnerney comes squarely
within that definition.
Appellant has stated the law which is designated as
Section 42-2-19, U. C. A. 1953, on page 11 of his brief.
The procedure as outlined by the Utah statutes is such
that the department may subpoena witnesses and examine
the licensee with respect to his violations. The licensee has
under the law the right to demand the appearance of witnesses against him and if such demand is made, the witnesses. could and shouid be subpoenaed so that he may have
the right of cross examination. This he did not do. The
nature of the cause is civil and not criminal. At both the
hearing before ·Miller and the Court, McAnerney testified
regarding the citations. From his testimony alone the hearings substantially support the findings.
In the cases submitted by appellant the question of
whether the license is a right or a privilege is considered.
We submit that the license t? operate a motor vehicle on a
publi~ highway is a privilege granted by the state and not
guaranteed, nor is it an inalienable right.
The weight of authority is to the effect that the driving of an automobile upon public highways is. a privilege
and not a property right and is subject to reasonable regulation under the police power in the interest of public
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safety and welfare. In a leading case involving the financial responsibility law of New Hampshire, Rosenblum v.
Griffin, 89 N. H. 314, 197 A. 701, the court stated:
"The operation of an automobile upon the public
highway is not a right but only a privilege which
the state may grant or withold at pleasure. What the
state may withhold it may grant upon condition.
* * * The statute confers a privilege which the
citizen is at liberty to accept by becoming a licensee,
or not, as he pleases. Having accepted the privilege
he cannot object to any conditions which have been
attached thereto by a grantor with power to entirely
withhold the privilege."
See Thornhill v. Kirkman, 62 So. 2d 740 (1953) ; Rawson
v. Department of Licenses, 15 Wash. 2d 364, 130 P. 2d 876
(1942) ; Doyle v. Kahl, 242 Iowa 153, 46 N. W. 2d 55 (1951).
As to whether the proof adduced was improper, we
call the Court's attention to the case of Carnegie v. Department of Public Safety, 60 So. 2d 728 (Fla.) (Special Division B 1952), where the court held:
"Because it appears that the lower court may
have misconceived its duties and responsibilities
under Section 322.31, Florida Statutes, and for the
future guidance of the courts in hearing 'appeals'
under the provisions of this statute we feel it incumbent to point out that Section 322.31 requires
the court on such appeal to take testimony and examine into the facts of the case, and to determine
whether the petitioner is entitled to a license or is
subject to suspension, cancellation or revocation of
his license under the provisions of this chapter."
In construing a similar provision of the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code, 75 PS, para. 193, the courts of that state have
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uniformly held that the cases are heard' de novo by the
court and not merely as a review of the action of the department charged with the enforcement of the Vehicle Code
of that state; that it is the duty of the court "to hear evidence and determine in the exercise of its sound discretion
and in the furtherance of justice whether the license should
be suspended."
This would certainly seem to be the better rule, where
as in this state the department is authorized to suspend
without a hearing and the operator may appeal, directly
to a court of record from such suspension, so that the hearing before the court is the first opportunity he has had to
present his side of the story and to confront and cross examine the witnesses against him. While the policies developed by the department in the course of its enforcement
of the Drivers' License Act should be given due consideration by such court, we hold with the Pennsylvania courts
that such court has the jurisdiction and responsibility to
make its own findings of fact independently of the ex parte
administrative findings of the department.
In this case a "hearing" was had before George Miller,
the Director of the Drivers' License Division, and in his
opinion there was sufficient evidence to suspend the license
of the appellant. Upon the proper proceeding the matter
was brought before the District Court of the Third Judicial
District of Salt Lake County, Utah, and upon that hearing
(de novo) the court determined that the license as suspended should be affirmed.
Throughout appellant's brief there is a contention that
the operative clauses of the law are unconstitutional due
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to the fact that they are in violation of the due process
clause of both the United States Constitution and the Constitution of Utah. In that respect, may we make this further observation. The fact that the suspension of a driver's
license by a Motor Vehicle Administrator before affording
the licensee an opportunity to be heard on the matter violates the due process clause of the 14th Amendment to the
Federal Constitution, and likewise to that amendment of
the Utah State Constitution which provides that no state
shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property without
due process of law, it has been determined by the courts
construing statutes similar to ours in the following manner.
The Supreme Court of Florida, in· expressing the majority view of the American courts on this point-that failure to provide such an opportunity for a prior hearing does
not constitute a denial-of due process of law-said in Thornhill v. Kirkman, 62 So. 2d 740 (1953):
"Increase on highway casualties is one of the
most impelling social questions now confronting the
public. Civic. bodies and law enforcement officers
at every level are bending their efforts to reduce
them; To hold that the Legislature must provide
notice and a hearing to one charged with flagrantly
abusing his use of the highways before he can be
stopped from using them, would not only be unjust
to the public, it would place an intolerable burden
on enforcement officers. We think the provision for
hearing after suspension of one's license meets every
requirement of the process."
Following through with the substance of the previous
enunciation by the court, we are firmly of the opinion that
the essence of a claim of denial of due process seems to be
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that the appellant's license was suspended by the Director
without a proper hearing. The statute does not require
the Director to give such a hearing prior to suspension of
a license, whenever he has reason to believe that the holder
thereof is an improper or incompetent person to operate
motor vehicles or is operating so as to endanger the public.
The information upon which the Director acts may turn
out to be erroneous (and for that reason the right of review
before a board of appeal is given). We have no doubt that
these provisions of law are reasonable regulations in the
interest of safeguarding lives and property from highway
accidents. The incident hardship upon an individual motorist, in 'having his. license suspended pending investigation
and review must be borne in deference to the creater public
interest served by the statutory restriction,. It seems to us
that it is well settled that the concept of due process of law
does not necessarily require the granting of a hearing prior
to the taking of official action in the exercise
the police
power. When justified by compelling public interest, the
Legislature may authorize some action subject to later judicial review of its validity.'
There seems to be some question in the brief of appellant that the sl!spension or revocation is a penalty and that
the appellant has been twice- in jeopardy and that as a
result thereof certain violations previous to the one in 1958
should not be considered as a basis for his final suspension.
Our law specifically provides that a suspension by the Director may_be_ imposed if the licensee .has three moving violations within a period of 18 consecutive months. In this
case, the driver, Mr. McAnerney, while having been suspended by virtue of certain violations in 1957, still had three

of
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consecutive violations within an 18 month period from that
time until1958 when his license was finally suspended again
by the Director of the License Division.
The argument with respect to the withdrawal of the
driving privilege as being a penalty in addition to the fine
or penalty imposed by the court where the law requires
mandatory suspenson or revocation, or discretionary suspension or revocation, is given consideration in the case of
Commonwealth v. Ellett, 174 Va. 407,4 S. E. 2d 762 (1939),
wherein the court answered the argument as follows:
"Within the limits prescribed by law, the trial
court fixed a measure of punishment for each offense. The penalty of being deprived of the right to
operate a motor vehicle is not a part of, nor within
the limits of the punishment to be fixed by the court
or jury."
And again in the case of Pritchard v. Battle, 178 Va. 455,
17 S. E. 2d 393 (1941), the court commented:
"The question as to whether the revocation of a
license because of an act for which the licensee has
been convicted or because of the conviction itself
is an added punishment has frequently been before
the courts. The universal holding is that such a revocation is not an added punishment, but is a finding that by reason of the commission of the act or
the conviction of the licensee, the latter is no longer
a person fit to hold and enjoy the privilege which
the state had heretofore granted to him under its
police power. The authorities agree that the purpose
of the revocation is to protect the public and not to
punish the licensee."

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11

It is quite possible that the proceedings before the Director were not in full accordance with judicial practices,
but, nevertheless, he, acting in a quasi judicial capacity,
had the right to either subpoena or not to subpoena witnesses unless demand was made upon him by the appellant
(which demand was not made) and to examine the licensee
and from such examination to determine whether or not
the appellant McAnerney, was in his judgment a habitual
negligent driver and a menace on the highways of the State
' of Utah. The District Court, having full jurisdiction, considered the facts and the evidence, and determined that the
appellant was a habitual negligent driver and was, therefore not entitled to have his license reinstated.
~:

CONCLUSION
We submit that the respondent, Mr. Miller, acted within
his administrative powers and that the District Court, in
sustaining him in such action, did not err. We therefore
further submit that the decision of the lower court should
be affirmed and that the appellant go hence with his costs
herein incurred.
Respectfully submitted,
E. R. CALLISTER,
Attorney General,
WALLACE B. KELLY,
Assistant Attorney General,
Attorneys for Respondent.
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